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THE CAUSALITY BETWEEN TAX AND SPEND OF THE 






While this paper tries to fill a particular niche in the literature on the 
tax and spend nexus of the public sector, it provides new insights on 
the causality between public expenditure and public revenue from a 
small island developing economy perspective. We apply the 
Johansen technique to uncover the dynamics characterising the public 
sector’s decision–making process with respect to taxing and 
spending. In particular, data covering the period 1970-1999 are used 
to test this causal link by applying a Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism (VECM).  
 
   It is found that unidirectional causality runs from public revenue to 
public expenditure. This result, which is consistent both in the short 
run and the long run, implies that the government taxes first and then 
spends. Further, an important implication of our result is that the lack 
of evidence in favour of fiscal synchronization (bi-directional 
causality between tax and spend) would make it easier for the fiscal 
authority to dictate either its revenue or spending plans, hence 
making fiscal policy a stable and an effective tool for demand 
management in Mauritius. 
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1. Introduction 
 
   In the public finance literature, a subject matter that has gained 
much importance over the past two decades is the synchronization of 
fiscal action; which is about the sequencing of government’s taxing 
and spending plans. Put differently, this pertains to whether the 
government has to raise tax revenue first and then spends or vice-
versa. The timing of this fiscal action is an important element 
especially because public revenue and public expenditure are tools of 
fiscal policy and an understanding of their inter-relationship or 
independence is an essential aspect in policy formulation. In 
particular, for countries running huge fiscal imbalances, it might 
contribute to the formulation of specific policies with regard to 
demand management. In fact the theoretical underpinnings of the 
causal link between these two variables are diverse as they are 
associated with different schools of economic thought. Needless to 
add, the corresponding divergences of views and tenets provide the 
alternative approaches to the hypothesis under inspection. From a 
Keynesian perspective, for instance, it is a stylized fact to spend first 
and then tax.  
 
   This is based on the principle of compensatory finance, whereby 
fiscal deficits are created to boost up the level of economic activity. 
Subsequently, through a built-in mechanism, the budgetary multiplier 
effect would itself eliminate any output gap and ensure a higher tax 
base, from which the extra tax revenue would be generated to offset 
the initially created fiscal deficit. Hence, the spend and then tax rule 
characterizes this Keynesian advocacy.  
 
   On the other hand, classical economists believe in what is known as 
fiscal neutrality, that is, the budget must always balance. A strong 
implication of this proposition is that the government must ensure 
that its expenditure does not exceed its revenue proceeds. This tenet 
is based on the premise that any mismatch between public 
expenditure and public revenue could have distortionary effects on 
the smooth operation of the price mechanism. Hence fiscal neutrality 
in this context dictates a tax and then spend paradigm. As one would International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-3(2004) 
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expect this hypothesis diametrically opposes that of the Keynesian
1. 
What mediates both these extremes is the fiscal synchronization 
hypothesis, a situation where the motivation to tax and to spend is 
determined simultaneously. Lindahl (1958) and Musgrave (1966) had 
pointed out a third possibility in the timing of this fiscal action. 
While Lindahl used the concept of Benefit Principle to tax (see 
Brown and Jackson (1991) for a concise analysis) to justify the 
simultaneous determination of tax and spend, Musgrave argued its 
essence in the fiscal  federalism context, more precisely, in the 
valuation of municipal services whereby causality runs from both 
sides between raising local taxes and raising local expenditures. 
 
   Empirically, the timing between tax and spend is tested using 
standard causality tests. Granger causality tests have indeed been 
used to analyse this relationship in the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
with the advancement in time series econometrics, gradually, co-
integration and Error Correction Models (ECM) have been developed 
to improve on the spurious regression results that were generated in 
previous studies. Moreover, ECM-based causality tests have emerged 
that provide more robust results and refinements in understanding the 
causal links between public revenue and public spending. Indeed, 
current empiricism on this issue remains mixed.  
 
   While Von Furstenberg et al. (1985), Manage and Marlow (1986), 
Miller and Russek (1990) and Owoye (1995) have found evidence in 
favour of the fiscal synchronization hypothesis, that is, bi-directional 
causality between tax and spend, Bohm (1991) and Baghestani and 
Mcnown (1994) have established no causal link between these two 
variables. Hoover and Sheffrin (1992) and Vamvoukas (1997) have 
observed that causality between public revenue and public 
                                                 
1 Barro (1974) used an inter-temporal framework characterised by 
overlapping generations model to show that consumers treat current public 
debt and future tax liabilities as equivalent. In this way, government may 
follow a spend and then tax rule, by taxing less today and raising tax levels 
in future. Since little evidence exists in favour of Barro (1974) for 
developing countries (Seater (1993)), the Keynesian hypothesis is more 
relevant in such countries. Sobhee, S.                                       Tax and Spend of the Public Sector in Mauritius 
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expenditure is highly susceptible to the time period under inspection. 
Consolidated data therefore over a long period might not be 
indicative of such hidden trends.  
 
   Hence, in this paper, we extend the literature by firstly providing 
additional empirical evidence on this issue using data pertaining to 
the Mauritian economy in the post-independence period; and, 
secondly, applying the recent developments in time series 
econometrics to analyse the behaviour of budgetary aggregates. The 
case of Mauritius is interesting given that it is a small open island 
economy in which the fiscal agent has been playing a major role in 
its economic progress since Independence in 1968. Furthermore, it is 
one of the few African economies that have shown remarkable 
growth performance in recent years with an average real growth rate 
performance of 5%. While public revenue has increased due to 
improvements in the tax base, public expenditure has also been 
soaring quite rapidly to cater for the growing welfare needs of the 
population.  
 
   The current size of the public sector, measured in terms of public 
expenditure as a ratio of GDP is found to be 23%. Moreover, fiscal 
deficits constitute a recurrent feature of the public finances in the 
country, and often exceeded 5% of GDP in the past few decades. In 
fact, in the 1970s the emphasis was more on the demand 
management framework as opposed to that of the late 1980s, which 
was more of a supply-side approach, combined with more market-
friendly strategies. This was done in an attempt t o restructure the 
public finances and restore macroeconomic confidence in the 
economy. 
 
   As an overview of the budgetary process, it is good to note that 
around 80% of the public revenue of the Mauritian economy come 
from expenditure or indirect taxes. N on-tax revenue represents an 
insignificant proportion of overall revenue given that public 
investment in income generating assets is not substantial and 
surpluses from nationalised industries are largely inexistent. At the 
beginning of financial year 2000-01, about 80% of total government 
expenditure were financed out of taxation and the remaining from International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-3(2004) 
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PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement). Average rate of 
taxation is equal to 17.3% of the economy’s GDP.  
 
   Regarding expenditure, which represents around 22% of GDP, the 
government has been massively investing in human capital and in 
particular education. The latter absorbs 17% alone while health and 
social security share 8.3% and 21% respectively of the overall 
expenditure budget, the most expensive one. In addition, there is a 
major disparity between current and capital expenditure.  
 
   The ratio is 4:1. Actually, fiscal imbalances emanating from public 
policies over the recent years have been clustering around 4%-6%. 
The prevalence of these fiscal deficits could be attributed to the fact 
that government has been involved in long-term public investment 
projects in infrastructure, construction of schools and health centres 
along with the promotion of tertiary education. Such capital 
expenditure projects have been financed mostly out of domestic as 
well as foreign borrowings. Tax proceeds have been by and large 
appropriated to finance current expenditure of the government.  
 
   Given such trends, it would be difficult for one to ascertain whether 
the government has been using a policy of spend and tax or tax and 
spend rule or whether spend and tax decision was jointly determined. 
We therefore set on to investigate this causal link in the next section 
and comment on the relevant findings for the design of policies. The 
remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows: in section 2, a 
model is discussed to test the causality between tax and spend, in 
section 3, the data are analysed, altogether with the empirical 
estimates and in section 4 we conclude. 
 
2. A  Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
 
   In order to test for any of the above paradigms, standard trivariate 
causality à la Granger (Granger (1969), (1981)) can be carried out 
between government spending, government revenue and a control 
variable national income. We believe that the inclusion of this third 
variable would be to capture the effects of tax on public spending via 
output and vice-versa. It is a well-known fact that with Sobhee, S.                                       Tax and Spend of the Public Sector in Mauritius 
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macroeconomic variables it is difficult to rule out endogeneity and 
more so with national income data. Changes in income can affect 
either tax revenues or public expenditures, which can in turn, affect 
their counterparts in a second round (See Vamvoukas (1997) for a 
more detailed account of the inclusion of this variable in a parallel 
study. Given that we are dealing with time series data, the possibility 
of non-stationarity of variables cannot be ruled out.  
 
   Therefore, we propose further to use multivariate co-integration 
technique based on Johansen (1988) to study the  relationship 
between tax and spend. Within this technique, we will also carry out 
further analyses through impulse responses pertaining to the 
observed dynamic relationships captured respectively by VECM. The 
VECM methodology which constitutes the core of  our testing 
procedures can be theoretically represented as follows; 
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   Where µ and ? are uncorrelated error terms and E(ut,us)=0, 
E(vt,vs)=0 for all t s, E= Government Expenditure, T= Government 
Tax Revenue, m s and n s  stand for the maximum lag lengths and l is 
the usual lag operator. Here it is to be noted that in both these 
equations the lagged error terms have been included. They are 
inserted here as error correction terms pertaining to our co-
integrating regressions. While et-1  is the one -period lagged value of 
et, obtained from the co-integrating equation of E on T and Y; wt-1 is International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-3(2004) 
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the one-period lagged value of  wt, obtained from the co-integrating 
equation of T on E and Y. In this framework, the optimum lag-length 
can be derived on the basis of Akaike’s Information Criterion. 
Moreover, for causality to run from tax to spend, the coefficients a1, 
all the bj s and the coefficients of Y, the lj s have to be significant 
altogether. Similarly, we can capture the causality from spend to tax 
whenever the coefficients b 1, all the jj s and all the Jjs are jointly 
significant. In addition, if evidence in favour of the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis is found, then all the coefficients 
mentioned above are expected to be significant.  
 
3. Data and estimation issues 
 
   The data used in this exercise pertain to the Government Finance 
Statistics (annual issues). The sample period covered is 1970 to 1999 
which represents an active post independence period over which the 
Mauritian economy has evolved socially, economically and 
politically. Before proceeding further with our analysis, we 
investigate into the possibility of non-stationarity of the variables E, 
T and Y. 
 
   We apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test proposed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) to firstly ascertain the order of 









1 1 1 2 1 0 log log log  
   
   Where t is a time trend and y  is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed. Choice of m largely depends on the 
number of available observations and the maximised value of 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the optimum lag 
length. The ADF test is applied to our variables, namely, E, T and Y 
and it is found that the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity could not 
be rejected for all the three variables. The results are reported in 
Table 1 below. 
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                      Table 1: Unit Root tests of Variables 
Variable  ADF Statistic 
         logEt 
DlogEt 
   logTt 
     D logTt 
  logYt 







                       *Significant at 5% (see Mac Kinnon’s (1991))  
 
   Thus, all variables are integrated of order 1, as they become 
stationary after first difference, as shown in the above table. Further, 
we investigate into the possibility of any long run relationship 
between E, T and Y using the Johansen co-integration technique. We 
proceed to establish the co-integrating vector(s) in the relationship Tt 
= f ( E t, Yt). We observe that a unique co-integrating vector exists 
between T, E and Y and this is based on both the Maximal 
Eigenvalue test or Trace test statistics at 5% level of significance 
from regressions with restricted intercepts and no trends. The results 
are shown in the following tables (Table 2(a) and Table 2(b)).  
 
Table 2(a) Co-integration Results Based on Maximal Eigenvalue 
Statistic 






r =0  r =1  48.68  22.04  19.86 
r£1  r =2  13.25  15.87  13.81 
r£2  r =3  6.8  9.16  7.53 
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is T; (ii) Eigen values used in descending 
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Table 2(b) Co-integration Results Based on Trace Statistic 






r =0  r =1  48.68  22.04  19.86 
r£1  r =2  13.25  15.87  13.81 
r£2  r =3  6.8  9.16  7.53 
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is T; (ii) Eigen values used in descending 
order are: 0.85, 0.39, 0.23 and 0.00 and  (iii) Order of VAR is 4 (determined 
from AIC). 
 
   Having established that a long-term relationship does indeed exist 
between E, T and Y, we thus proceed to provide estimates of the 
dynamics that characterise this unique relationship. We report the 
empirical coefficients of the VECM for each variable, Government 
Expenditure (E) and Government Revenue (T), in Table 3 below. In 
this ECM-based causality exercise, it is good to remember that Y 
plays the role of a control variable, and tends to track any additional 
feedback effect which the endogenous variable may have on the 
dependent variable. The optimal lag length in the two equations, 
based on AIC, is set at 3. 
 
   We can find that it is only in the ‘DE’ equation that the lagged 
value of the residual is significant. In general, the coefficients in the 
tax equation are insignificant and it appears that neither public 
expenditure nor GDP turn out to explain changes in tax revenue. This 
finding is consistent with  Sobhee (1999) and Sobhee (2003) 
reporting discretionary measures in raising tax and isolation of tax 
changes against income fluctuations given that around 80% of tax 
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Table 3:Vector Error Correction Model Results for Variables E and T 
 
  Dependent Variable: DT   Dependent Variable: DE 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio 
DE(-1)  0.11  0.21  1.4  5.4* 
DE(-2)  -0.002  -0.005  0.88  4.8* 
DE(-3)  0.28  0.75  0.8  4.4* 
DT(-1)  0.5  1.2  -0.4  -1.9** 
DT(-2)  -0.18  -0.47  -0.1  -0.56 
DT(-3)  -0.75  -2.13*  -0.38  -2.2* 
DY(-1)  -0.79  -1.34  -1.4  -5.04* 
DY(-2)  1.04  1.19  -1.0  -2.5* 
DY(-3)  0.15  0.27  0.27  0.98 
ECM(-1)  -0.41  -0.94  -1.4  -6.4* 
Diagnostics  -
R
2 = 0.35; F = 2.5 
LM = 0.35 (0.54) 
RESET= 4.1 (0.1) 
JB = 3.39 (0.18) 
ARCH = 0.02(0.88) 
-
R
2 = 0.72; F = 8.3 
LM = 2.2 (0.14) 
RESET = 2.4 (0.12) 
JB = 1.3 (0.53) 
ARCH = 0.04 (0.85) 
Notes: (i) * indicates significance at less than 5%, ** indicates significance 
at less than 10%; (ii) LM refers to the Lagrange Multiplier statistic for serial 
correlation, RESET refers to Ramsey’s test of misspecification of the 
functional form, JB is the Jarque Bera test of normality of residuals and 
ARCH represents the test for Autoregressive Conditioanl Heteroscedasticity 
(iii) the probability value of each diagnostic test is given in brackets and is 
within the acceptable norms (iv) The ECM term emanates from the co-
integrating equation of the unique vector. 
 
   Alternatively, in the expenditure equation we find that both tax 
changes and income changes do explain variations in public spending 
plans. This would imply and expenditure system dependent directly 
and indirectly (via the administrative penetration) on tax collections. 
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   Moreover, the finding is consistent in both the short run and the 
long run. However, to to have more insights through the causal links 
between these two variables, we proceed with the usual F tests of 
zero restrictions. In the first equation, the joint test of zero restriction 
was imposed on coefficients a1, the  j b s and the  j l s, whereas in the 
second equation, the restriction was imposed on coefficients b 1, the 
j j s and the  j J s. It is found that the test of restriction was valid in 
the ‘DT’ equation and not in the ‘DE’ equation, clearly implying 
that unidirectional causality is found to exist between the two 
variables of interest and more particularly running from ‘DT’ to 
‘DE’.  
 
   Hence, while changes in tax revenue precede changes in public 
expenditure, no evidence is found to support the contention that 
changes in public expenditure influence changes in tax revenue. 
From a policy standpoint therefore, the result obtainable by us 
indicates that the state can influence its spending patterns subject to 
changes in its tax structure and revenue outlay. Moreover, the lack of 
evidence in favour of the bi-directional causality between these two 
fiscal variables make fiscal policy a more stable tool than otherwise 
would be the case. 
 
   Besides, these findings can be further confirmed through the 
impulse responses in each equation. These can be tracked from the 
figures illustrated below (LX1 stands for the tax variable and LX2 
represents the expenditure variable): 
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   Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the responses in each endogenous 
variable following a one standard error shock in the respective 
VECM equation. Over a horizon of 12 periods, it is can be clearly 
observed in Figure 1a that the evolution of public spending follows 
the same trend as that of tax revenue. Initially, we observe a decline 
in both variables but subsequently an increasing trend is observed 
with public expenditure following suit as tax increases. 
 
   However, in Figure 1b we observe that seemingly both endogenous 
variables evolve in the same manner following the standard error 
shock in e xpenditure, but the periodic response is not very similar. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies  Vol.1-3(2004) 
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Tax changes do not necessarily respond with a lag or with lags to 
changes in public spending. What is more appealing is that 
expenditure changes rather precede changes in tax. In either direction 
therefore, we see that it is tax changes that induce expenditure 
changes and not vice-versa. Also, in either case, the shocks do not die 
out and persist over at least the 12 periods shown. Since our main 
focus is on tax and spend, we do not discuss the impulse responses of 




   The tax and spend, and spend and tax, paradigms are tested using a 
VECM over the period 1970 to 1999 using data pertaining to the 
public finances in Mauritius. Indeed, empirical results confirm that in 
this small island economy, the tax and spend paradigm holds, that is, 
the government first mobilizes the necessary tax revenue to make up 
its spending. This result is found to hold both in the short run and the 
long run and indicates that by and large the government wants to be 
careful in monitoring its spending plans conditional on the resources 
it has already mobilized.  
 
   However, the fact that the Mauritian public finances have been 
characterized by fiscal deficits on several occasions,  we may not 
view the tax and then spend rule as a necessary mechanism to avoid 
budget deficits. It could just be a precautionary measure to avoid 
fiscal imbalances in general or a tool to dictate the course of public 
spending. Also, absence of the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis or 
the inter-dependence between these two fiscal variables makes it 
easier for the government to use either of them as a reliable 
instrument for policy decision-making than would be the case under 
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